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INTRODUCTION 
Objective 
In April, 1977 the President's statement on water projects recommended 
that a number of federal water development projects, including the Bonne-
ville unit of the Central Utah Project, not be completed. The ensuing 
efforts of project supporters brought about a review of the projected 
costs, benefits, and other political, social and environmental factors 
and consequently, the current issue is not whether or not the project should 
be constructed. Rather, the objective of this report is to examine the 
following question: 
Given the fact that at least the 5 units of the CUP which 
have already been authorized will eventually be constructed, 
what is the most desirable rate of construction funding? 
Study approach 
As a first step in answering this question for the specific case of 
the Central Utah Project, it is helpful to list the general issues one 
needs to consider in setting a rate for funding the construction of a 
major water resources project. Factors favoring faster construction 
include: 
1. Sooner realization of project benefits. 
2. Savings of construction cost at at time of rapid inflation. 
3. Savings in right-of-way cost at a time when land prices 
are also increasing very rapidly. 
4. Sooner fulfillment of commitment to project beneficiaries 
and other project supporters to have a functioning project. 
5. Sooner termination of the hassle associated with efforts 
of project opponents to halt construction of an uncompleted 
project. 
Factors favoring slower construction include: 
1. A reduced rate of project funding permits the funds 
instead to be used for other pressing needs or for tax 
reduction. 
2. A project that provides water that is not yet really 
needed will have unused capacity until the demand increases; 
in other words, a project completed too soon will not realize 
a return on the investment until the demand for project 
output increases. 
3. Once a project is completed. one has lost the flexibility 
of modifying the design to take advantage of developing 
technology or provide outputs and services more important 
to future generations. 
4. Rapid construction requires more workers and may bring more 
construction workers into a local community than the available 
public services can absorb. 
When one compares these lists of factors. some favoring faster construc-
tion and others favoring slower construction, one can visualize the 
possibility of an economic efficiency evaluation that will determine an 
optimal construction rate, the best possible (least cost) compromise 
between the factors favoring faster construction and those favoring 
slower construction. Economists have in fact. developed a model for 
this type of analysis. One computes the present worth of all the benefits 
(this becomes larger the sooner the project is completed) and the 
present worth of all the costs (this becomes smaller the longer the 
project is delayed) for various rates of project construction and 
selects that rate which maximizes net project benefit. 
Within such a model, however, one is not free to select any 
construction rate because of limitations to how rapidly or how slowly 
a project can be planned or constructed. The planning process requires 
people to do the work and a certain deliberation that cannot be done too 
quickly. If the planning requires a certain number of man-hours, the 
planning agency may not be able to hire the necessary staff quickly 
enough either because of personnel ceilings or because sufficient numbers 
of trained people may not be available. The technical reviews necessary 
to make sure that an engineering design will be physically safe, not be 
harmful to the environment. and be socially acceptable require time, 
and hurrying any of these processes too much could lead to serious 
mistakes. The construction process is subject to many of the same issues 
with respect to personnel and safety, but it can be speeded up by 
working. longer shifts in a crash construction program. Such construction 
is, however, more costly because of the greater overtime required. In 
combination, these factors place a limit to the maximum feasible rate 
of project implementation. 
While it is true that too rapid an implementation rate does increase 
costs of construction and dangers to the environment and to public safety, 
it is also true that many of the specific constraints of these sorts 
are imposed by legislation or administrative rules that may not be well 
supported by the facts. Planning processes could be accelerated by 
cutting red tape, but this may require special legislation. Personnel 
ceilings limit the number of people that the Bureau of Reclamation 
can hire for planning) design) and construction supervision but Congress 
could either lift them or permit or require the Bureau to do more of 
this work through contracts with private engineering firms. Conceivably) 
Congress could also provide funds (either through cost sharing or other 
programs) to the State of Utah or some unit of local government to 
construct selected project units while the Bureau is concentrating all 
its forces on other units. 
Other limitations pertain when construction becomes too slow. The 
fixed costs of program administration continue regardless of the rate 
of progress and become a larger and larger portion of the total the more 
the project is drawn out. Delays expose work to becoming out of date 
and having to be redone. 
The approach of this study is to examine the question of optimal 
construction rate for the Central Utah Project and the factors con-
straining the maximum rate at which it can be constructed. The method-
ology is to examine the pertinent data within the files of the Bureau 
of Reclamation and other agencies involved in the project, discuss 
the issues with all the informed people who can be readily contacted) 
and make the best judgments possible based on the experience and inde-
pendent judgment of the study team at the Utah Water Research Laboratory) 
the research arm of the water agencies in Utah State government. 
Scope of report 
The CUP consists of: four units which were authorized in 1956 by 
the Colorado River Storage Project Act - the Bonnevi11e~ Vernal) Jensen) 
and Upalco Units; the Uintah Unit which was authorized in 1968; and the 
Ute Indian Unit which is being studied for feasibility but is not yet 
authorized. 
The dominant unit of the CUP (more than 80% of the cost of the 5 
currently authorized units) is the Bonneville Unit. This unit is itself 
a very complex project consisting of 12 reservoirs, and many water col-
lection and distribution aqueducts, tunnels, canals, drains, and a major 
hydropower generating facility. Figure 1 is a map of the area involved 
which locates the various components of the Bonneville Unit. The purpose 
of this unit is to import water from the Uintah Basin in the Colorado 
River drainage to several Wasatch Front and Sevier River Basin counties. 
The other units will develop water entirely for use within the Uintah 
Basin. Because it so dominates the CUP with its size and complexity, 
this report will deal principally with the completion schedule of 
the Bonneville Unit. It should be noted. however, that because of 
interactions, both hydraulically and legally between units, either 
delays or speedup of the Bonneville Unit will likely produce proportional 
delays or speedup of the other units and therefore the analysis presented 
here can be applied in a general way to the entire CUP. 
It was clearly not feasible within the scope of the study to develop 
independent data from which costs and benefits of this billion dollar 
project could be estimated. The quantitative information on costs 
and benefits used here were obtained from the USBR personnel in the 
Provo CUP office and the regional office in Salt Lake City. Additional 
background information was obtained from the Central Utah Water 
Conservancy District. 
Previous Construction Schedule 
The origna1 construction schedule proposed for the Bonneville Unit 
in the definite plan report (1964) required 17 years and a cost of 309 
million dollars. The project actually started in 1966 and after 13 years 
(end of FY78) 167 million will have been expended, but this amount now 
represents only 19% of the current total estimated cost of $862.7 million. 
The tremendous increase in cost is due primarily to inflation (85%) and 
secondarily to such things as design changes to accomodate more environ-
mental considerations and other minor changes in scope (15%). 
The current funding level is $33 million/year. At this level (plus 
increases for future inflation) it will take 22 additional years (34 total) 
to complete the Bonneville Unit. This is exactly twice the originally 
projected construction duration. 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SPEEDUP I~WACT 
In order to determine the effect on economic efficiency of various 
construction durations the total stream of future benefits and costs were 
reduced to present worth quantities. This analysis was based upon dis-
counting at 6 5/8% interest) the current rate required by federal policy. 
The actual repayment of reimburseable costs by the water users through 
the Central Utah Water Conservancy District (CUWCD) will be at 3 1/8% 
(the rate specified by repayment contracts). However, the economic 
analysis presented here was viewed from the perspective, not of cost and 
benefits to local water users but rather from a national perspective. 
The costs to society are represented here as the total construction costs 
plus operating and maintenance costs all discounted at 6 5/8%. The ad 
valorem taxes and water user fee collected by the district are not con-
sidered in this portion of this analysis but are discussed later as part 
of an analysis of construction schedule impact upon user fees. 
The economic analysis examines three potential construction schedules 
as follows: 
(1) Continuation at an annual expenditure level of about $33 million/ 
year for 22 additional years. 
(2) Completion at a rate that would have matched the original (1964) 
schedule in terms of % completion per year for the remaining 79% of the 
project. Completion would require 13 years on a variable schedule 
reflecting an assumed timing of completion of certain major facilities 
and a maximum annual construction expenditure of $60 million. 
(3) Completion in 8 years at a maximum annual construction expendi-
ture of $112 million. 
.' 
For each of these three schedules, the construction cost 
(Figure 2). the operation and maintenance cost (Figure 2), and the 
benefits (Figure 3) have been estimated for each year over the life of 
the project (approximately 100 years). 
Annual benefits corresponding to these 3 schedules have been esti-
mated, as have variations in O&M costs. The construction periods 
for individual program items of the 8 and 22 year schedules are displayed 
in Figure 4. In each case the analyses were made in terms of 1978 
dollars. The total construction cost is taken as $653 million in each 
case because time did not permit analysis of the effects of speedup 
on unit prices,l This represents costs after FY1978. Previous costs 
are, of course, treated as sunk investments which do not impact future 
planning decisions. 
Figure 5 displays the variation in present worth (1978 base) of 
the future streams of costs and benefits as construction schedules vary. 
Except for the top two lines (which will be discussed later) inflation 
was ignored. At a discount rate of 6 5/8% a slightly negative effect 
of speedup is observed in that costs increase at a faster rate than 
benefits. With the 22 year schedule the present worth of benefits and 
costs are essentially equal at $382 million (in agreement with the 1977 
administrative review). The 13 year schedule would produce costs which 
exceed benefits by 1.8% ($463 and $454.8 million present worth). The 
8 year schedule produces costs which exceed benefits by 2.4% (523.5 
and 510.9 present worth). 
methodology for this type of analysis '>las. submitted to the Bureau 
of the Budget by the Office of Water Research and Technology in 1975 
under the title "Economic Impact of Fiscal constraints on Water Project 
Construction. II 
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Figure 2. Timing of costs for various construction schedules. 
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Figure 3. Timing of benefits for various construction schedules. 
Program Item 
Upper Stillwater Dam and Reservoir 
Soldier Creek Dam, Strawberry Res. 
Enlargement and Collection Works 
Hayes Dam and Reservoir 
Mona Dam and Reservoir Enlargement 
Goshen Bay Dike 
Jordanelle Dam and Reservoir 
Jordan Aqueduct System 
Rehabilitation Duchesne River 
Area Canal 
Wasatch Aqueduct and Laterals 
Deer Creek Dike, Pumping Plant. 
Canal and Laterals 
Mona-Nephi Pumping Plants, Canal 
Laterals and Switchyards 
Elberta Canal and Laterals 
Mosida Pumping Plants, Canals 
and laterals 
Nephi-Sevier Canal 
Provo Bay Associated Features 
Duchesne River Drainage 
Diamond Fork Power Complex 
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Figure 5. Present worth analysis .. 
This analysis shows that at the current federal interest rate, 
providing costs closer to the front end of the 100 year life of the 
project has a larger impact (less discounting) than the effect on speeding 
up benefits (which always lag the costs), but that the effect is rela-
tively minor compared with uncertainties which are inherent in this type 
of analysis (for example, the assumption that costs and benefits inflate 
at the same rate). 
The analysis presented here was based upon a 100 year (1979-2078) 
stream of future benefits and O&M costs. Whether or not one agrees 
with this assumed project life is of little consequence since at 6 5/8% 
interest, the difference in present worth between a 75 year life and 
infinity is less than 1%. 
Effect of differential inflation rates 
The present worth analysis discussed previously was made in terms 
of 1978 dollars. Its validity rests upon the assumption that future 
inflation will change costs at the same rate as it changes the value of' 
benefits and therefore can be ignored. Inflation during the last decade, 
however, has impacted heavy construction costs at a consistantly higher 
level than inflation of consumer prices in general. Inflation in 
consumer prices is considered to represent the best available index of 
inflation of CUP benefits. Table 1 compares the USBR construction com-
posite bid price index to the consumer price index over the last decade. 
Table 1. Price Indices. 
USBR CPI RATIO 
Year INDEX INDEX (USBR/CPI) 
1967 1.0 1.0 1.0 
1970 1.16 1.12 1.036 
1975 1.87 1.69 1.106 
1976 2.01 1.80 1.110 
Table 1 indicates that construction costs have increased 11% more than 
the general cost of living during this decade (about 1% per year difference 
in rate of inflation). 
In order to quantify the impact that this difference would have upon 
the present worth figures discussed previously, the following revised 
analysis was made: rather than assuming some inflation rate for benefits 
and a higher rate for costs, benefits were kept in terms of 1978 dollars 
but consturction costs (not O&M costs) were inflated by 1% per year. 
The types of benefits included (listed in order of decreasing magnitude) 
are municipal and industrial, irrigation, hydropower, recreation, flood 
control, fish and wildlife, and water quality. 
The results of the 1% inflation differential applied to costs is shml1ll 
near the top of Figure 5. The present worth of costs under these condi-
tions is greater than that of benefits for any construction schedule, but 
a speedup of the construction narrows this gap. For instance, with the 
22 year schedule the present ~.;rorth of the stream of construction costs 
was increased by $32.1 million while comparable increases for the 13 and 
8 year schedules were only $27.7 and $22.4 million. This suggests a $10 
million arguement in favor of speedup to the 8 year schedule if the current 
1% differential in inflation rates continues. A higher differential would 
of course increase the advantage of completing construction as quickly as 
possible. 
Hydropower inflation 
The present worth analyses presented previously assumed a value of 
energy at 1978 levels (except that the 1% differential increase in 
construction costs indirectly reflects the impact of rapid inflation of 
energy costs). Hydropower is an important fraction of total benefits 
(11 out of 55 million per year at full capacity) for the Bonneville Unit. 
The Diamond Fork Power Complex will generate 133 megawatts of power from 
the 2000 foot drop in elevation from Strawberry Reservoir to the valley 
floor in the Bonneville Basin. A pumped storage (recycling) alter-
native design which is currently being evaluated would increase this 
capacity dramatically and would have a very favorable impact on project 
benefits. 
The benefits from power generation are therefore a very important 
part of this project. In order to evaluate the impact of a continued 
rate of inflation in energy costs (hydropower value) which is greater 
than that of consumer prices in general, the following present worth 
analysis was made: hydropower benefits were increased by 2% per year 
for 20 years (beginning in 1978) and other costs were kept unchanged. 
These results are also displayed in Figure 5. The hydropower benefits 
are increased by $30.5 million for the 22 year construction schedules 
and by $36 and $41 million for the 13 and 8 year schedules. This 
implies a $10.5 million advantage for speedup to 8 years at the 
assumed 2% inflation differential. If the pumped storage alternative 
is constructed)the earlier beginning of power benefits would have a 
much greater impact. 
OTHER FACTORS EFFECTED BY CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE 
The above analysis from the economic efficiency perspective suggests 
an advantage to speeding up project construction to an annual funding rate 
reaching $112 million annually (solid line on Fig. 2). The question at 
this point is then whether the constraints to very rapid construction out-
lined in the introductory section would make it unadvisable to attempt this 
rate of construction in the case of the Central Utah Project. 
USBR manpower considerations 
The USBR work force assigned to the CUP consists of 120 persons total 
in the Provo and Duchesne (field offices). In addition, design administra-
tion work for the CUP is done by the Denver Center (major design) and the 
SCL Regional Office (administration and minor design items). ' The current 
annual cost chargeable to the CUP which is generated by this work force 
is about $4 mi11ion~ about 3/4 of which is produced by the Provo and 
Duchesne Offices. This work force is currently administering a $30 million 
annual program (which includes the $4 million overhead). 
USBR officials estimate that in order to gear up to construction at 
the $100 million plus level required by an 8 year completion schedule would 
require (during a 3 year transition period) 155 persons in the Provo and 
Duchesne offices (and comparable emphasis of CUP work in the SLC and Denver 
Offices). 
The current federal manpower ceiling under which the USBR is operating 
clearly imposes an important constraint to such major staff increases in 
these offices. Adoption of the 8 year schedule would require either 1) 
special federal (congressional 1) approval for new hires in violation of 
the manpower ceiling or 2) a major shift of personnel within the USBR 
region plus a shift between regions (requiring a lower level of effort in 
some other region). These measures would be required in addition to con~ 
tracting as much design work as possible to private consultants. One 
additional approach to expediting preconstruction work would be to give 
the funds and responsibility for some portions of the project to the 
State of Utah, The Central Utah Water Conservancy District, or some other 
governmental entity_ These more radical departures from past USBR 
practice, however, would in themselves take some time to arrange as a 
number of difficulties could be expected in working out the details. 
Safety constraints 
New USBR policy requires a technical review of all USBR dam designs 
by a non-federal organization. Also, under current policy some elements 
of actual design can be contracted to private consultants but the design 
of major dams cannot. These policies greatly limit the use of private 
consultants to expedite schedules on a project such as the Bonneville 
Unit which includes 12 dams. Rather, current policy requires USBR design 
plus a non USBR review--which implies longer than historic periods for 
final design. 
The issue here is whether or not these restrictions (design must be done 
by USBR staff and outside reviews) with their associated time delays are 
really the most effective way to ~rotect public safety. Certainly it 
would be possible for congress to revise these procedures. and surely 
there are faster ways to complete proiect design without endangering the 
public, but the development and implementation of a faster and yet safe 
design procedure is in itself a difficult and time consuming task. 
Environmental Impact Statements and Other Pre-construction Work 
Environmental Impact Statements are currently requiring at least one 
year to write and another year for approval. This assumes no challenges in 
the courts by environmental interests. 
Again potentially, as in the case of the safety policy, congress 
could short cut these procedures, but it would be difficult to develop 
and implement quicker methods that would ensure protection of the environ-
ment. 
One might expect that during the recent slow down in the level of 
construction appropriations, that the engineering force would have 
proceeded with such things as EIS preparation, gathering of design data 
(Provo Office), procurement of right-of-way, and final design (Denver 
Office) and that a back log of project design, would exist, in a form 
almost ready for construction bids. Unfortunately this is not the case. 
Funds to do these tasks are not made available to USBR until the funds for 
the facilities themselves have been appropriated. As a result, most of 
the remaining facilities still require development of design and environ-
mental data, preparation of final designs and statements of the environ-
mental impacts of those designs, review of the designs for safety and the 
statements for adequacy, and procurement of right-of-way before construction 
can begin. These tasks fall in a progression with each one building on the 
one before, and consequently much of the work on the later tasks must 
'-lait until the former tasks are completed. 
This situation suggests that one way for congress to accelerate the 
construction schedule would be to appropriate all the money necessary 
to complete the above tasks as quickly as possible so that the entire pro-
ject does not have to wait for their completion. Speeding up processes 
where haste could threaten public safety or the environment is an alto-
gether different matter than preventing delays caused solely by the agency 
waiting for the necessary funds to be appropriated. 
Social impacts 
Some have expressed concern that a dramatic speedup in the rate of 
project construction would not allow sufficient time for orderly economic 
growth. This would result in a large influx of transient workers into 
construction areas and would increase crime rates, insurance rates and 
problems associated with providing temporary housing, schooling, police 
and fire protection, waste treatment, etc. 
The main advantages brought about by this rapid influx of people would 
be economic ones such as increased tax base, imployment and income. It 
would appear that the most desirable mix of indirect economic benefits to 
communities involved, minimization of social problems related to construction, 
and realization of direct benefits to local water users would be produced 
from a moderately accelerated but not overly rapid construction schedule. 
Cost of Administrative Review of Projects 
A very significant component of the total cost to society of such 
projects is the annual effort to justify a budget level and particularly 
the occasional major effort which is expended (by both pro and anti groups) 
when the question of whether to proceed or terminate the project is 
raised. For example, some of the cost generated by the administrative 
review of the Bonneville Unit during 1977 includes: 
(1) Time and travel by CUPWCD personnel - $100,000 
(2) Time and personnel of the USBR Provo Office (over 6 month period)-
$200,000. 
(3) An unknown amount spent by project opponents, by government 
officials at higher levels in the administration, and decision makers 
all the way up through the congress. 
(4) Cost of inflation due to delay of construction ($653 million 
balance delayed 6 months at 6 percent annual inflation) = $19,590,000. 
The last item is a stream of future costs which should be discounted at 
6 5/8% to determine a present worth (which would be much smaller than 
the $19 million shown but still would be millions of dollars). Very 
large projects such as the Bonneville Unit .seem to experience major 
review·s periodically (usually 4 to 8 year intervals when new admini-
strations begin). The major costs represented particularly by delays 
during inflationary periods would appear to represent.an important 
reason to speed up completion, thereby minimizing the number of these 
reviews. 
Geographic jealousies 
Under the present construction schedule, the completion dates (and 
thus beginning of the accrual of benefits) of the various units of the 
CUP are spread over a long period of time. Because of this fact, feelings 
and jealousies have arisen among the groups of people to whom the benefits 
accrue, and these feelings are likely to grow and increase in severity 
until the project is completed. Some have already started to receive 
benefits, while others aren't scheduled to receive any until after the 
year 2000, and they consider this to be discriminatory. Some feelings 
exist also among people in the Uintah Basin about transporting their water 
to communities on the Wasatch Front. The sooner the construction can 
be completed so that all concerned with the project start to realize 
actual benefits, the sooner these geographical jealousies can be laid 
to rest. 
Of particular concern are the feelings and relationships between the 
Indians and non-Indians. Any acceleration of the construction schedule 
will serve to improve the delicate relationship that now exists, as a 
result of written but as yet unfulfilled promises to deliver to the Ute 
Indian Tribe the water to which it is entitled under the Winter Doctrine 
as recognized by the Deferral Agreement of·1965. 
Unit notices and effect of inflation 
Reclamation projects authorized during the past 25 years or so have 
tended to benefit agricultural users less than municipal or industrial 
users. The reason is the higher repayment capacity of the municipal 
and industrial sectors coupled with the rapid growth rates of urban areas 
in the Western U.S. The Bonneville Unit of the Central Utah Project is 
no exception in tha~ the municipal and industrial benefits exc~ed the agri-
cultural benefits ($24.3 as compared to $15.8 million per year). The 
repayment contracts for M&I waters reflect a high cost per unit of water 
used, generally higher than alternative local sources of water available 
for development by M&I users. Eventually with further growth, however, 
these sources will be exhausted, and the imported water will be needed. 
Any extra present cost may therefore be justified by inflation making 
future construction much more expensive. 
It is the practice of the USBR to issue unit or block notices when 
parts of the project are completed and ready to be used. These notices 
inform those required to pay for the project that repayment is about to 
begin and specifies the amount of payment and the due dates. The 
District is allowed a development period of from 10 to 20 years to sell 
the water and then has a time period to complete payment (usually 60 
years from beginning of 1st payment). At the present rate of construction 
the Bonneville Unit would not be completed until the year 2000 and no 
block notices for M&I water could be issued before that time. The 
Jordanelle Dam, the Utah Lake dikes, and the Diamond Fork Plant must all 
be finished in proper sequence before any water can be supplied for M&I 
uses. There would appear to be a definite financial advantage if the 
project could be completed as soon as possible, thereby fixing the repay-
ment structure at a level resulting from construction with less inflated 
dollars. 
In order to determine the impact of speedup on cost of water the 8 and 
22 year construction schedules will be examined. Rather than using 1978 
dollar quantities, it will be necessary to estimate future inflated dollar 
final costs and income to the Cm~CD. 
If construction costs continue to inflate at a rate similar to the aver-
age rate since beginning the project (about 6 percent compounded) final 
construction costs will be $1,374 million for the 8 year schedule (1978) or 
$3,107 million for the 22 year schedule (2000). 
With a 60 year repayment for reimbursible costs the annual quantities 
will be as follows: 
Year 
1986 
2000 
Annual Payment 
$22.9 million 
51.8 million 
In order to meet these payments, the District will use income from 
their ad valorem taxing authority plus user fees. The annual income to 
the District (at 2 mills) is currently about $4 million. If the tax base 
inflates at the same rate as the above costs, this tax will produce the 
following future amounts: 
Year 
1986 
2000 
2006* 
Annual Tax Income 
$ 6.7 million 
15.1 million 
21.5 million 
*20 years after issuing unit notice for 8 year construction schedule. 
Groundwater along the Wasatch Front currently represents an alterna-
tive source of water to CUP water. In Salt Lake County, this groundwater 
presently costs about $24 per acre foot. If energy costs inflate at the 
same rate assumed for other costs this source will cost $38/ac ft by 1986 
and $86/ac ft by 2000. In order to meet the repayment schedule estimated 
above, CUP water will cost $73/ac ft if costs are fixed at the end of the 
8 year schedule (1986) or $165 if fixed at the end of the 22 year schedule. 
These figures include only USBR construction costs, thereby ignoring treat-
ment and other O&M district costs but do show the dramatic impa~t of con-
struction speedup. The district tax itself will almost meet total federal 
reimbursible costs 20 years after the 8 year completion (repayment doesn't 
normally begin until 10 to 20 years after issuing block notices). The 
user fee charges would in this case be needed only for operating costs 
and additional treatment and distribution system construction costs. Also, 
it appears that CUP water could compete with local groundwater costs by 
the year 2000 if the project is complete and costs are frozen after the 
8 year completion schedule but would not compete for many more years if 
a 22 year schedule is followed. 
SUMMARY 
Factors Favoring Speedup in Funding Level 
From the perspective of the residents of the 10 counties in Utah which 
will receive water from CUP facilities,there are very compelling reasons 
why the project should be constructed at an accelerated schedule (see the 
discussion of cost of project water as impacted by timing of unit block 
notices). This report, however, has for the most part approached the 
economic analysis from the perspective of the United States taxpayers rather 
than that of Utah residents. Even from this national perspective, given 
the decision that the CUP will be completed, there are economic efficiency 
and non-economic reasons to complete it more rapidly than the current fund-
ing level will allow. These factors include the following: 
(1) The economic efficiency analysis included in this report shows 
that if the inflation rate differentials between heavy construction, con-
sumers prices and energy costs continue either at the rates of the last de-
cade or at increased relative rates, the project should be completed as 
rapidly as is practical. If the economy were shifted to a non-inflationary 
or deflationary mode, then the present worth analysis would no longer provide 
a reason for speed up but employment of manpower might then become a dom-
inant reason for speedup. The above economic analysis (given persistance 
of current inflation trends) would suggest that the optimal completion 
schedule is the shortest possible (such as the eight year schedule identi-
fied in Figure 2). However, the difficulties in achieving such rapid con-
struction suggest a more moderate acceleration may be optimal. 
(2) An important social difficulty related to any major water importa-
tion scheme is the negative reaction of residents of the basin in which 
water is produced. The approach to ameliorating these feelings in the case 
of the CUP has been the promise of additional development within the water 
source region (the Uintah Basin) as part of the overall development. How-
ever, when these promises were made based upon one schedule and then appro-
priations are not forthcoming to meet that schedule, many kinds of intra-
basin as well as interbasin jealousies are generated. Within the Uintah 
Basin a CUP ad valorem tax protest is currently in progress, the objective 
of which is to produce higher priority for the Upalco and Uintah Units 
relative to the Bonneville Unit (the exporting unit). Whether or not 
this is justified (the Bonneville Unit also includes many developments for 
the Uintah Basin, some of which are already completed) the intrabasin 
jealousies represent a serious problem. Other sources of friction are 
related to the relative progress on the Indian and non-Indian facilities 
and on Duchesne County vs. Uintah County facilities. The common factor 
which ties all of these social difficulties together is that accelerated 
construction of all 'lnits of the CUP would minimize such problems. This 
seems to represent a major arguement for rapid construction. 
(3) Delays which generate additional overhead costs and major in-
flation in construction costs are caused by occasional major administration 
reviews of long term projects such as CUP. These can be minimized by 
completing the project as rapidly as possible. 
Factors which tend to constrain very rapid completion of the project in-
clude the following: 
(1) The current federal manpower ceiling represents a major deter-
rent to the 8 year completion schedule. Adoption of this schedule would 
require federal approval to ignore the limitation on new hires or some 
other special arrangement. The 13 year schedule, however, could likely be 
accomplished by merely changing personnel assignments within the USBR. 
(2) Even w'ithout a manpower ceiling, an important constraint to ex-
tremely rapid but safe design and construction of the many dams required, is 
the availability of many additional highly trained specialists in soils and 
structural engineering. The increased emphasis on safety of USBR dams re-
quires that most of this work be done Ifin-house" by the Bureau and that out-
side design reviews then be accomplished. Since the eight year schedule 
would require almost simultaneous design of all facilities, including dams, 
this appears to represent a major constraint. 
(3) The eight year schedule could be achieved only if there are no 
environmental or water right challenges or that any litigation be quickly 
decided in favor of the project. This does not appear to be a teasonable 
assumption. 
(4) An extremely rapid construction schedule would undoubtedly limit 
time for coordination with other developments such as energy production 
facilities and recreation facilities which otherwise could use project water, 
and could have a negative social impact upon small communities which would 
have to temporarily supply services for construction workers. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It appears that a realistically achievable level of financing for the 
Bonneville Unit (in 1978 dollars) is $60 to $70 million per year until 
completion. Even so pre-construction planning, design reviews to protect 
public safety, environmental analysis, right-or-way purchase, etc. will 
cause a two-year delay before this rate can be achieved. This construction 
rate represents a schedule between the 8 and 13 year curves of Figure 2 and 
would complete the unit in 10 to 11 years (about 1988). Other units of the 
CUP which were not analyzed in this report should receive comparable 
acceleration in schedules. This recommendation is based upon what appears 
to be a reasonable compromise between economic efficiency, quicker real-
ization of benefits, adequate time for the deployment of personnel to make 
sound and safe design decisions, and adequate consideration of environmental 
issues. 
A very important point to make here is that it will not be possible 
to achieve a faster rate of project construction than that recommended in 
the preceding paragraph by simply increasing the annual funding authorization. 
Special actions will be needed to overcome the manpower limitations 
placed on the USBR for necessary planning and construction supervision~ 
to expedite currently required reviews to ensure darn safety and protect 
the environment, and to provide for construction workers at remote sites. 
Threatening court cases will have to be closely watched; and unless they 
can be forestalled, the effort to complete the project sooner will be in 
vain. Possible actions for overcoming some of these difficulties are 
discussed in the body of the. report. 
